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ABSTRACT
The push to increase the capability of satellites has driven significant increases in space battery performance over
the past fifty years, progressing to the use of today’s state of the art technology: Lithium-ion. To date Lithium-ion
batteries have flown on many missions and have demonstrated their tremendous potential to increase the capability
of both large and small satellite technologies.
However, recent events in the consumer electronics industry have highlighted the risk of this technology when
handled improperly, and several factors are currently combining that increase both the likelihood and hazard of a
battery failure: the larger size of spacecraft batteries in general, the push for ever greater energy density, and the
shrinking infusion period both for payload and platform technologies.
This paper discusses the necessary
precautions that must be made to ensure safe use of Lithium-ion technology via the lessons learnt from a fifteen year
Lithium-ion space battery program at ABSL. This program has yielded more than fifty successful launches and the
space qualification of five Lithium based COTS cell technologies without a single safety incident.
substantial programmatic delay to destruction of
hardware and injury of personnel.

INTRODUCTION
A major part of the dry mass of a spacecraft must be
allocated to batteries to sustain power when solar arrays
are in shadow. The push to increase the capability of
satellites leads to a desire to reduce the mass of
‘housekeeping’ systems such as batteries to allow more
sophisticated payloads. Thus, the past fifty years of the
space industry has seen increases in the energy density
of space battery technology from Nickel Cadmium
through Nickel Hydrogen through today’s state of the
art: Lithium-ion.

Within the small satellite community, many groups are
exploring or have used Commercial Off The Shelf
(COTS) battery technologies. These batteries are
attractive to the small satellite community for their
performance and scalability, offering tremendous
potential to increase the capability of small satellite
technology. However, if not designed, handled, and
operated properly, such technology presents a safety
risk. This paper discusses the inherent risks and
corresponding precautions that should be made when
utilizing this technology via the lessons learned from a
fifteen year Li-ion space battery program at ABSL.
This effort has yielded more than fifty successful
launches and the space qualification of five Lithium
based COTS cell technologies without a single major
safety incident.

Recent events in the consumer electronics industry with
laptop batteries seemingly spontaneously combusting
highlight the risk of this high energy density technology
when not handled properly. In the space industry, three
factors are combining that increase both the likelihood
and hazard of a battery failure: the growing energy
levels of spacecraft batteries in general, the push for
ever greater energy density, and the shrinking infusion
period both for payload and platform technologies.
Were a highly energetic failure to occur during
integration, on a fuelled spacecraft, or on a stacked
launch vehicle, the penalties could extend well beyond
Neubauer

LITHIUM-ION CAPABILITIES
To date, Li-ion batteries are a space proven technology
that can improve the performance of nearly any
satellite. ABSL, the world leader in Li-ion space
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batteries, has demonstrated the ability to provide high
energy density (up to 110 Wh/kg) systems for a variety
of missions. More than fifty vehicles have been
launched and flown without failure using ABSL
batteries, having accrued more than 17,000 flawless cell
years of operation in space.
They have flown
successfully to Mars, Venus, deep space, La Grange
Points and have powered the PROBA vehicle for more
than 7 years and 40,000 cycles in low Earth orbit
(LEO). A new launch vehicle, due to fly in August
2009, is completely powered by ABSL Lithium-ion
from Avionics to Pyrotechnic to Flight Termination to
270V Thrust Vector Control Systems. A similar ABSL
design is about to become the first man rated high
voltage Li-ion battery to fly on the international space
station. In addition, a new high energy ABSL Li-ion
battery approaching 150 Wh/kg is undergoing
qualification to power the tools and life support of
NASA astronauts during their space walks.

LI-ION RISKS
The Li-ion chemistry is capable of extremely high
current delivery. For example, several small format (~1
Ah) high rate Li-Ion cells are capable of delivering
more than 60 A. Clearly, when integrated into a large
capacity pack, the current delivered when a low
resistance circuit is applied to the battery terminals
could easily exceed several hundred amps and cause
serious damage to hardware and severe injury to
technicians.
Furthermore, the uncontrolled release of the large
quantities of energy stored in Li-ion cells via thermal
runaway often poses a greater risk. Thermal runaway is
a condition that can occur in Li-Ion cells in which the
cell begins generating heat in a self-sustaining, and
even self-accelerating manner (i.e. the cell continues to
generate heat regardless of the cell current). This leads
directly to an uncontrolled rise in cell temperature that
can ultimately result in the forceful venting of
electrolyte, fire, and explosion. The onset of thermal
runaway is primarily induced by high cell temperatures,
but the event is highly sensitive to state of charge
(SOC) as well.

With such an extensive space heritage, the test data to
cover missions exceeding 9 years and 100,000 cycles,
and manned flights on the horizon, ABSL can and has
provided the performance advantages of Li-ion to the
most risk averse customers and missions. However,
ABSL has also recognized the attention to safety that
must be paid in an industry that is seeing more and
more energy packed into smaller and smaller volumes.
Throughout their Lithium-ion space battery program,
ABSL has had a proactive approach to safety and, over
the past 10 years, has completed an extensive
investigation to quantify the risks of the various Li-ion
chemistries and develop a battery architecture that
maximizes performance without sacrificing the
necessary levels of protection.

E. Peter Roth at the Sandia National Laboratory has
conducted several studies on the occurrence of thermal
runaway in Li-Ion cells1. These studies have suggested
three generalized phases of thermal runaway:
First is the onset of thermal runaway (typically starting
between 80 and 150°C, depending on chemistry and
various other factors), characterized by sustained and
accelerated self heating. Behavior in this region is
highly dependent on SOC, with higher SOCs
correlating to lower onset temperatures. Subsequently,
a second phase of self heating can occur at higher
temperatures where gases generated by chemical
reactions within the cell can cause it to vent, thus
providing a temporary drop in the self heating rate.
Finally, if temperatures continue to increase, a third
phase of thermal runaway can be witnessed that is
characterized by extremely high self heating rates. This
phase sees the final breakdown of the cathode
(releasing oxygen) and of the anode passivation layers,
as well as an exothermic reaction of the released
oxygen with the electrolyte.
The progression of a Li-ion cell through all three phases
of thermal runaway typically brings along fire and the
destruction of the cell itself, and thus presents
considerable hazard. Preventing the occurrence of
thermal runaway is therefore of critical importance.
This implies limiting the environmental and operational
conditions of the battery. Of particular concern are
overcharge conditions, in which a cell is charged to

Figure 1: ABSL has designed and delivered Li-ion
batteries for a broad range of space applications
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extremely high SOCs where self heating rates are
exaggerated and thermal runaway is more likely to
occur. Operation at high current, either in discharge or
charge, can also pose such a risk due to the resultant
heating of the cell.
COTS CELL PROTECTION DEVICES
COTS cells typically have several devices built-in to
protect against the above noted risks of Li-ion
chemistries. It is important to understand how these
devices are designed to work, and perhaps more
important to understand their limitations. These points
are discussed below along with examples of the
performance of ABSL’s heritage Li-ion cell, the
18650HC, However, it is important to note that the
performance of such devices can change dramatically
with other cell models due to differences in design and
quality of production.
Positive Temperature Coefficient (PTC) Polyswitch

Figure 2: Positive Temperature Coefficient (PTC)
Polyswitch

A PTC is made up of a composite of semi-crystalline
polymer and conductive particles as illustrated in
Figure 2. At low temperature, the conductive particles
form low resistance paths through the polymer. As
temperature increase past the polymer’s switching
temperature, the polymer’s crystallites melt and expand,
disturbing the low resistance paths and dramatically
increase PTC resistance. When the PTC returns to low
temperature, it will also return to a low resistance state
as the polymer contracts and the conductive pathways
are reformed.
Placing a PTC in series with the electrodes, as is done
in many COTS Li-ion cells, turns the PTC into a
resettable short circuit protection mechanism – high
currents induced by a low resistance external path can
increase the PTC temperature beyond its switching
temperature and activate its high resistance state, which
in turn reduces current to a more safe level. If the short
circuit is removed, current will stop and eventually the
PTC will cool and return to a low resistance state.

Figure 3: Response of the PTC in the ABSL
18650HC Li-ion Cell

Since this thermally driven process takes time, short
duration high current pulses are not impeded. This can
be a positive from the point of view of mission needs
where fuse blowing or pyro activation may be a
requirement. However it can also be a negative, in that
the temporary application of a low resistance circuit to
the battery terminals could result in a current spike that
damages hardware or injures operators. Characterizing
PTC activation with respect to time, rate, and
temperature at the cell level via test is necessary to
properly understand the performance and protection of
each cell. Example results of such testing for ABSL’s
heritage 18650HC cell are shown in Figure 3.

Neubauer

Extensive cell testing has shown PTC’s to be excellent
at limiting current flow with one exception – high
voltage applications can cause the PTC to fail
permanently to a low resistance state. The battery
voltage for which this occurs varies with every cell
model. Thus, at a minimum string level testing is
required to verify functionality. To this end, ABSL has
performed a multitude of string and battery level PTC
tests. Two noteworthy cases are illustrated below in
Figure 4 and Figure 5, showing the PTC breakdown
voltage for the ABSL 18650HC cell is greater than 33.6
V, and thus qualifying the cell for use in 8s, ~28 V
assemblies.
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Assuming though, that the PTC functions as intended,
there is still a risk of catastrophic failure if the PTC is
generating enough heat to raise the cell temperature and
induce a thermal runaway scenario. Preferably, battery
level testing should be performed to ascertain the
tolerance of a given cell design to such a scenario in the
context of the final battery insulation (thus taking into
account the thermal properties of the battery design).
The ABSL 18650HC’s safety in this regard has been
verified for installations employing ABSL’s standard
battery architecture and variants thereof via testing of a
battery module designed to insulate the cells from the
environment (Figure 6). In this manner the test case
exhibits temperature increases in excess of those seen in
actual practice, and thus be more likely to induce
thermal runaway. The results of this test, however,
showed a very minimal increase in temperature (~5° C
over ambient) and no leaking, venting, or any other
catastrophic failures. Thus it was proven that ABSL’s
standard architecture is tolerant to sustained discharges
through tripped PTCs.

Figure 4: Response of the PTC on the ABSL
18650HC Li-ion Cell in an 8s pack shows proper
PTC operation

Current Interrupt Device (CID) & Vent
A CID responds to the build-up of internal cell pressure
which results from high temperature and high SOC
(typically much greater than 100%) operation. At some
critical pressure, the CID burst disk deforms and breaks
the electrical connection of the cell, preventing the flow
of further current (Figure 7). Thus the CID is primarily
intended to prevent the onset of catastrophic failure via
thermal runaway as a result of an external source
overcharging the cell.
Figure 5: Response of the PTC on the ABSL
18650HC Li-ion Cell in a 10s pack shows PTC
breakdown due to an overvoltage condition

A large number of cell level tests have shown that the
CID reliably acts to electrically disconnect the cell in
response to high temperature, high SOC conditions.
However, if the cell has reached a sufficiently high
temperature prior to CID activation, the self heating
rate of the cell can be high enough to continue
increasing cell temperature without the influence of an
externally supplied current. To at least partially address
such situations where cell temperature and internal
pressure continue to increase even after CID operation,
the burst disk incorporates precise grooves that provide
failure points to release the internal pressure in a safe
and controlled manner (i.e. not via can explosion, metal
fragmentation, and wide debris release). This feature is
most commonly referred to as a vent. The vent is
designed to activate after the CID burst disk deforms
and before the cell can bursts.
Unlike the PTC, neither the CID nor vent is resettable.
Once one of these mechanisms is activated, the cell
should be electrically considered an open circuit.

Figure 6: Thermally insulated battery module used
for short circuit protection verification of the ABSL
18650HC Li-ion cell
Neubauer
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PTC testing discussed above. As can be seen in Figure
8, the study showed that a CID activated properly to
shut down the current, but cell temperatures did not
peak until approximately 30 minutes afterwards. The
temperatures in excess of 120° C induced venting in
several cells, but no flame or explosions occurred.
Subsequently the cell temperatures were seen to
decrease back to safe levels, due to (1) the absence of
continued charge current due to CID activation, (2) the
increase in heat dissipation rate from the pack to the
environment due to increased temperature, and (3) the
cessation of internal self heating due to the evacuation
of electrolyte and possible melting of the separator.
Shutdown Separator
In some cases the venting of the internal cell gases will
decrease the self heating rate and impede further
internal reactions sufficiently to stop thermal runaway,
but this is not always the case. The final level of
protection built-in to COTS cells is a shutdown
separator placed between the anode and cathode. This
porous separator nominally allows the transfer of ions
between the electrodes, but at high temperatures the
separator begins to melt and the pores close shut. With
ion movement restricted, further self heating reactions
are also halted.

Figure 7: Current Interrupt Device (CID)

Separator shutdown can be an effective means of
preventing catastrophic cell failures; however, they are
not resettable, they often activate after cell venting
(which itself can be catastrophic if vent gases ignite),
and their melting can lead to voids in the electrical
insulation between the anode and cathodes, creating an
internal short.
Because of these reasons, it is
recommend that one not rely on shutdown separators
for protection, but rather to treat them as a reserve line
of defense and to make every effort to control hazards
adequately and prevent the need for the use of this
device.
BATTERY LEVEL PROTECTION STRATEGIES
As discussed in the previous section, individual COTS
cells often include several safety devices that can
impede the onset of hazardous conditions (such as a
thermal runaway scenario) as a result of abusive
operation (e.g. application of a short circuit,
overcharging the cells, etc.). However, when multiple
cells are assembled to build a battery, failure modes
become more complex. Therefore it is important to
consider the safety implications of how such cells are
assembled into a battery and take advantage of
opportunities to improve safety and fault tolerance
when available.

Figure 8: Results of overcharge testing on a
thermally isolated 8s2p module
This sequence of events is demonstrated by an
overcharge test conducted previously by ABSL. This
module was constructed to minimize thermal
conductivity to the environment and encourage high
cell temperatures, much like the previous module for
Neubauer
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a risk of thermal runaway.
The precise outcome
depends on the impedance of the short and the battery
configuration.

Topology
The topology of a battery defines the basics of how
multiple cells are electrically connect to provide the
desired capacity and voltage levels required by the
system. Typically, one of two basic approaches is
elected. In the first option (P-S), cells are first
paralleled together to build high capacity, low voltage
cell banks (often called “virtual cells”). Then multiple
cell banks are connected in series to achieve the desired
voltage. This topology is illustrated in Figure 9.

In the alternative topology option (S-P), cells are first
connected together in series to build high voltage, low
capacity cell strings. Then multiple cell strings are
connected in parallel to achieve the desired capacity.
This topology is illustrated in Figure 10.

Figure 9: P-S Topology

Figure 10: S-P Topology

The principle advantage of employing a P-S topology is
its friendliness to supplementary protection and
balancing electronics. Such electronics can provide the
ability to disconnect and bypass an entire bank of cells
(if the presence of a fault requires it) and / or actively
equalize the voltage of each bank (as can be necessary
to prevent overcharging or overdischarging individual
banks). With this topology only one active channel is
necessary per bank to provide such control; thus a
typical 28V battery (eight banks of cells in series)
requires only eight control channels regardless of the
size of the cell bank.

The S-P topology is not often amenable to the addition
of external protection or balancing electronics. This is
because one control channel is necessary for every cell,
and given that aerospace batteries can contain several
hundred cells, the complexity, mass, volume, and cost
penalties quickly become excessive.
Fortunately, the improved passive fault tolerance of the
S-P topology can negate the need for these external
aides.
By first connecting cells in series, the
redundancy of the built-in protection devices is
maximized. For example, in a 28V battery with each
string consisting of eight series connected cells, there
are eight serial connected CIDs and PTCs to protect
against overcharge and short circuit faults. Note that
since only one of these devices needs to function to
protect the string, up to seven protection mechanisms
could fail and the system could still be safe.

The most pronounced disadvantage of this topology is
its poor ability to handle a cell that has failed as a short
circuit. Such a failure could be due to factors creating
an external short across the cell terminals, of the
repeated overdischarge of the cell or a manufacturing
fault leading to a short circuit internal to the cell.
Mathematically, either case can be represented by the
addition of a resistor (representing the short) in parallel
to the affected cell bank in Figure 9. It is clear from
this representation that all of the energy stored in said
cell bank will be discharge through the short of the
failed cell. At best, the cell bank in its entirety will be
lost, removing a large fraction of the open circuit
voltage and capacity of the battery.
At worst,
temperatures of the failed and / or parallel cells could
become dangerously high during the discharge and pose

Neubauer

The S-P option is also more effective at handling short
circuit cell failures.
Again, the fault can be
mathematically interpreted as a resistor in parallel with
the affected cell. In comparison with the same failure
in a P-S topology, the resultant current flow through the
affected cell is reduced due to the resistance of the other
cells in that same string limiting current flow from
parallel strings. This means it is much less likely that
excessive temperatures and thermal runaway will result
from a short circuited cell in an S-P topology than in a
P-S topology. And furthermore, subsequent to the
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occurrence of the fault, the affect on battery level
performance is minimized. The affected string could
continue to function for some time without noticeable
affect at the battery level; however, the remaining cells
in said string will be operating at a much higher
voltage, and it is likely that one or more CIDs will
eventually activate to disconnect the string.
Afterwards, though, the battery will only suffer a small
capacity loss, with little to no degradation in voltage
levels.

overdischarge of the cell during cycling due to high
voltage dispersion levels. However, no anomalous
temperature increases, sharp voltage or capacity drops,
venting, or other catastrophies had been noticed during
testing corresponding with this event. Furthermore, the
string containing the cell was still functional. This
string was then electrically isolated and cycled at 100%
DOD. After an additional 68 cycles, a CID in an
adjacent cell in this string activated and shut the string
down open circuit thusly proving the ability of the
architecture to safely handle short circuited cells.

The fault handling effectiveness of the S-P topology has
been demonstrated by test and practice on several
occasions. One excellent example is the following case
of indirect overcharge. In addition to direct overcharge
events, the possibility of indirect overcharge exists even
when the total battery level voltage does not impose a
blatantly obvious overcharge state. This is due to the
presence of voltage dispersion among the cells of a
string. As is illustrated in Figure 11, a single cell can
be charged to a dangerously high level while the
average voltage remains within recommended levels.
Thus, if excessive voltage dispersion is present,
charging a string or battery to its nominal EOCV could
result in the activation of a CID.
Such a situation occurred repeatedly on two flight like
life test batteries (connected in parallel). In this test, the
batteries had undergone 1800 cycles of 40% DOD LEO
cycling with minimal dispersion and thus no indirect
overcharge. However, during integration operations
following a capacity measurement at the 1800 cycle
mark, an operator inadvertently applied a hard short.
Following the short event, this battery resumed LEO
cycling at 30% DOD. The hard short had increased the
magnitude and growth rate of voltage dispersion within
the batteries, resulting in the indirect overcharge of
many cells within the system over time. 2250 cycles
later, the effects thereof had accumulated and caused
the nominal activation of a CID. CIDs in subsequent
strings safely activated afterwards due to the same
indirect overcharge condition as shown in Figure 12
until it was decided to stop the test.

Figure 11: Indirect Overcharge

Note that as strings were safely being shut down,
capacity of the overall assembly degraded gradually,
without extreme temperature rises, venting, or
catastrophic results.
Such graceful degradation
provides confidence that even if a system level power
anomaly induced a hard short on orbit, flight operations
could potentially be continued for some time even after
such a dramatic event.
Detailed investigation of the battery after the test also
revealed that one cell in the system had suffered a short
circuit failure. This likely resulted from continued

Neubauer

Figure 12: Graceful degradation of flight like
battery modules in response to LEO cycling
following abusive conditions
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temperatures and avoiding thermal runaway scenarios
must be considered at the battery level. Here, three
safety objectives are sought: (1) the ability to reject
heat from the entire battery in response to faults that
affect the entire cell array, (2) the ability to remove heat
from a single cell (or subset of cells) in response to
moderate faults that affect only said cell (or subset of
cells), and (3) the ability to isolate the thermal runaway
of a single cell in response to extreme faults that affect
only said cell.

Cell Size
Cell size is an important factor in determining the
safety of a battery for two main reasons: segmentation
of energy and the ability to reject heat.
Segmentation of energy is important to protect against
the effects of faults affecting single cells (such as an
internal short circuit, for example). In such cases it is
often impossible to prevent the fault from propagating
through the entirety of the cell; if the result of this fault
is thermal runaway, the entirety of the cell’s energy
may be hazardously released. For example the energy
contained in a single ABSL 18650HC cell is19.5kJ
compared to 1.3MJ for a typical 100Ah cell.
Constraining catastrophic failure to a single small cell is
plausible; the inevitable cascade effect across multiple
large cells in a space battery would be devastating.

Clearly, the latter two objectives are conflicting in
many cases. The most practical means to prevent the
thermal runaway of a single cell in response to a fault
affecting only that cell is to design a structure that
shares heat quickly between all of the cells. In this
manner, a fault that in isolation might cause a cell to
increase in temperature by 100° C and induce a thermal
runaway event, could instead cause 100 cells to
increase in temperature by only 1° C with perfectly
benign results.
Conversely, however, the
implementation of a battery with high inter-cell
conductivity means that if a cell were to enter a thermal
runaway scenario, the heat transfer to surrounding cells
could be sufficient to induce thermal runaway in those
cells as well.

Heat rejection is important to control the thermal
response of the cell to faults. As discussed earlier,
thermal runaway is facilitated by the generation of heat
within the cell and accelerates at higher temperatures.
By maximizing the ability to extract a cell’s heat, lower
peak temperatures will result during all nominal and
off-nominal operations, thereby reducing the chance of
entering a thermal runaway state.

Additionally, the first seemingly simple objective of
total ability to reject heat typically can compete with
both safety and performance objectives. First, a high
total conductivity means that the cells are not well
insulated from their environment, and thus extreme
increases in environmental temperature could drive a
thermal runaway event.
On the other hand,
performance objectives often require that total battery
conductivity is low in satellite applications. This is
because the battery interface panel is often colder than
the cells’ optimal operating temperature. Under these
conditions it is beneficial to insulate the cells from the
cold interface and allow the waste heat generated by
nominal electrical operation to keep cell temperatures
above the interface temperature.

With regard to both of these factors, smaller cells are
safer. Smaller cells contain less total energy, and thus a
single cell fault will result in less catastrophic results.
In addition, it is easier to extract heat from smaller
cells, due to higher surface area to volume ratios and
shorter distances from the center of the cell to the
exterior where heat can be removed.
Smaller cells also add fault tolerance benefits, in that if
a single cell (or string of cells) is lost there is a lesser
impact to the entire system. For example, comparison
of small and large cell options in a 28V 100Ah system
with respect to the loss of a single cell shows that the
loss of one large cell will induce the loss of 12.5% of
both voltage output and total stored energy, whereas the
loss of a single small cell in a typical ABSL design
would only result in a 1.5% loss of capacity and energy,
with almost no effect on voltage levels. However, in
practice one must consider the effect to overall
performance as well – the use of smaller cells can entail
higher parasitic mass fractions, and thus lower overall
energy density. But even this point can often be offset
by the ability to fine tune the size and shape of a small
cell solution, minimizing the inclusion of excess
capacity not needed by the system.

To best meet all of these objectives, detailed thermal
analysis is required to identify the optimal thermal
design. This must entail thorough knowledge of the
cell’s thermal response to nominal and off-nominal
operations, as well as accurate consideration of the
battery structure and thermal pathways therein.
Thanks to the broad availability and low cost of COTS
Li-ion cells, ABSL has been able to conduct a large
number of abusive tests on the cells it employs and
build accurate electrical and thermal mathematical
models therefore. This in turn allows ABSL to design
in the necessary thermal management features to

Thermal Management
In addition to driving the selection of cell size, the
ability to reject heat in pursuit of reducing peak cell
Neubauer

8

23rd Annual AIAA/USU
Conference on Small Satellites

confidently provide the necessary level of protection
while maintaining the necessary level of performance.

faulted cells with nominal ones to be an effective
strategy for limiting the propagation of faults to noncatastrophic levels.
Additional Protection Mechanisms
As noted earlier, P-S topologies are often paired with
external protection electronics. At their best, these
systems can electrically isolate any cell in the battery if
it appears at risk of a catastrophic failure. However, in
batteries with a large number of cells, the monitoring
requirements to do so can become excessive.
Furthermore, there are always scenarios that such
systems cannot respond to, such as internal cell faults.
The safety of either topology can be further augmented
with other “add-ons”, from simple battery level fuses to
address short circuits, to complex diode-based networks
to prevent PTC failures in high voltage systems.
However, ABSL’s testing of batteries using its
18650HC has demonstrated that in most cases such
design features are not required to provide adequate
levels of safety.

Figure 13: Example Thermal Management Strategy
Abuse testing at the full module level has been
performed by ABSL to verify the levels of safety
provided by its designs. For example, overcharge
testing on a flight like battery module (Figure 14) has
validated both CID operation in highly parallel
configurations and the thermal management techniques
employed. Results showed the complete battery was
shutdown via the CIDs, that maximum cell
temperatures did not exceed ambient temperature by
more than 35° C, and that no venting, fire, or other
form of catastrophic failure occurred.

OPERATIONAL PROTECTION STRATEGIES
Regardless of which cell and battery level protection
mechanisms are physically employed in the system,
there are several operational safeguards which should
always be employed:
Limiting Voltage Range: Li-ion chemistries are highly
sensitive to over- and under-voltage conditions.
Subjecting a battery to voltages above their maximum
recommended voltage (typically 4.2 V per cell)
increases degradation and susceptibility to thermal
runaway. Conversely, discharge of a battery below its
minimum recommended voltage (typically 3.0 V per
cell) also increases degradation and could result in a
short circuit failed cell. Ensuring that voltage ranges
are not exceeded is therefore critical.
Limiting Charge/Discharge Currents:
Battery
operation above specified maximum charge or
discharge rates can result in accelerated degradation
and high cell temperatures. This can pose a risk of
thermal runaway. Charging at high rate is of particular
concern due to reactions within the cell and the fact that
the combination of high temperature and SOC is more
likely to occur, increasing the cell’s sensitivity to
thermal runaway. Limiting the maximum operational
rate is therefore highly recommended and this
consideration should remain forefront in mission
planning as more complex operational scenarios,
particularly in LEO and SSA applications looking for
rapid recharge capability.

Figure 14: Flight-like battery module employed for
overcharge testing
In addition, the indirect overcharge case discussed
earlier in which a similar flight like battery design
experienced the overcharge, overdischarge, and short
circuit failure of several individual cells within the
modules showed no notable temperature spikes of
individual cells and certainly no cases of venting or
other catastrophic failures. Thus this case demonstrated
the inter-cell thermal conductivity of the architecture,
and has shown the sharing of heat of individually
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Limiting Environment Temperature: Excessively high
environmental temperatures will increase the risk of
thermal runaway by elevating the maximum cell
temperature seen during operation. Long term storage
at high temperature will also accelerate degradation.

COTS cell suppliers vary enormously in terms of build
quality and consistency, both between different models
and batches of the same model. The needs of space
customers does not mesh with or drive the market
demand for COTS cells. As a result, cell build
standard, chemistry, production location, material and
component supply chain, and a multitude of other
factors that can effect performance are not necessarily
fixed. Subtle changes that might not affect a consumer
product needing 500 cycles for a year in a cell phone
might have a dramatic effect to a battery needing to
reach 5,000 cycles in a year of LEO operation.

Preventing Short Circuits: With high quality of
manufacture, inclusion of adequate protection
mechanisms, and employment of the above operational
limitations, the risk of catastrophic failure via thermal
runaway should be negligible. However, the risk of
damaging hardware and personnel via human error
cannot be completely mitigated. Given that Li-ion
chemistries are capable of extremely high rate
discharges, and that they still contain considerable
energy and voltage when fully discharged, such risks
should not be taken lightly.

ABSL has privileged relationships with commercial cell
suppliers and invests years understanding not just
production, quality, materials and cell performance
issues, but also the business plans of companies on
specific cells prior to investing in full space
qualification. Once a cell is qualified, cells are
purchased in very large quantities, the batch quality is
verified by extensive lot acceptance testing, all cells are
thoroughly screened to catch anomalous cells and
enable close matching within battery builds, and large
reserves are stockpiled to assure the availability of high
quality cells (inconjunction with
last time buy
arrangements)to meet the needs of future demand. This
general philosophy, which ABSL has found to be
necessary to delivering safe, high quality, high
reliability batteries for space applications, is practical
for an entity like ABSL producing batteries on a large
scale. The stockpiling aspects also mesh perfectly with
Responsive Space needs to ensure availability.

These risks are highest during manufacture, when the
insulation and protection features of the battery are not
yet in place. ABSL carefully controls its manufacturing
procedures to provide the necessary safety, and does
not recommend anyone but trained professionals pursue
such endeavors.
Interfacing with the battery, either for test or integration
on the spacecraft, poses the next greatest risk.
Improperly mating connectors and / or harnesses can
create a short. Particular care must be taken when
connecting multiple batteries in parallel. It is ABSL’s
recommendation that all battery interfacing be
performed with the batteries fully discharged to their
minimum voltage, that the battery connectors be mated
last (i.e. the harness should be mated to the power
management electronics before being mated to the
batteries), and, when possible, fused connector savers
be employed during test to provide protection if an
accidental short were to occur.

On university cubesat programs and other low-cost
missions, budgets are extremely tight and COTS cells
appear to be an attractive lightweight battery fix that
can be implemented at low cost. Yet it is not often
feasible for low cost and one-off battery build efforts to
implement a comprehensive approach to ensuring the
highest levels of safety, reliability, and quality as ABSL
does. Alternative small scale attempts using COTS
cells must be approached with extreme caution,
however. This is especially true when a single, small
batch of cells are procured, where the risk of battery
performance falling short due to cell to cell differences
is a minor issue compared to the potential for safety
problems due to poor selection of cell model or batch
wide performance defects. Subpar production quality,
for example, has led to several incidences of metallic
contamination within cells, leading to internal shorts
and thermal runaway as seen in laptop fire incidents.
Furthermore, it is ABSL’s experience that the
effectiveness of protection devices can vary greatly
between cell suppliers. Indeed, testing of some COTS
cells has revealed some batches of cells do not even
contain the protection devices they are advertized to

During the course of all battery handling, all metallic
items worn by the technician (jewelry, cufflinks, etc.)
should be removed and insulative rubber gloves should
be worn to further reduce the risk of short circuiting the
battery.
ON THE VARIABILITY OF COTS CELLS
ABSL has serviced spacecraft and launch vehicle
programs around the world using a variety of COTS
cells chosen for their optimal attributes to serve
particular applications. Four COTS cells have been
space qualified, three have flown with another to fly
this year. This may suggest that qualifying COTS cells
is relatively straightforward. However, these statistics
do not reveal the fact that in the last decade hundreds of
other COTS cells have been rejected by ABSL for
space use.
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employ. Therefore the possibility of catastrophic
thermal runaway event happening on cubesats and other
low-cost missions is real.
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION
Despite the proven performance benefits possible with
the use of Li-ion chemistries for space applications, the
use of energy storage technologies with increasing
energy density carries increased safety risk. ABSL has
proven a safe approach to yielding high energy density
batteries via the use of COTS cells. However, the
significant likelihood of catastrophic failure, such as a
thermal runaway event, via the use of custom cells,
especially large format ones, or the improper use of
COTS cells is apparent. During spacecraft integration
and test, such an event could lead to costly damage or
injury of personnel. However, the effects of an incident
propagating to a fuelled spacecraft and/or launch
vehicle are potentially devastating.
As the small satellite community continues to make
strides to increase the utility of smaller and smaller
spacecraft, it is crucial that Lithium-ion batteries do not
cause a safety incident to set back the industry.
Currently, cubesats and other low budget spacecraft
ride along with larger spacecraft with budgets orders of
magnitude greater. Thermal runaway of one of these
batteries leading to damage to a more primary payload
would be hugely detrimental to the industry.
The small satellite community must therefore be
particularly aware of the potential risks of not treating
Li-ion batteries with the respect they deserve. ABSL
performs a tremendous amount of testing at cell and
battery level to ensure the safety of its COTS based
products. The small satellite community must be
prepared to be equally thorough if they are to avoid a
safety incident.
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